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Damien Wright. Churchill’s Secret War with Lenin: British and 
Commonwealth Military Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 
1918-20. Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2017. Pp. 576.
Among the cemeteries managed by the Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission is the Archangel Allied Cemetery in Archangel, Russia. 
Though it is the final resting place of British and Commonwealth 
servicemen who died during both the First and Second World Wars, the 
overwhelming majority of the graves located there are those of men who 
perished fighting the forces of the Red Army during the Russian Civil 
War. Its “forlorn and overgrown” condition today (in author Damien 
Wright’s words) serves as a sadly appropriate metaphor for the popular 
awareness of the role British and Commonwealth forces played in that 
conflict (p. 298). Before the war between the Soviet Union and the 
West went cold, they served as part of a multinational effort to support 
the anti-Bolshevik Whites in their failed attempt to topple the Soviet 
regime in Moscow. Yet today their efforts often go unremembered in 
the West in the story of Russia’s relations with the outside world.
According to Wright, this was by design. As he sees it, “[t]he 
British government attempted to cover up its military involvement 
in Russia, 1918-20 by classifying official documents relating to the 
campaign under the ‘50 year rule’”(p. 298). This statement may come 
as a surprise to some readers, considering that the fifty-year rule was 
applied to nearly all internal state documents in Britain at that time, 
not just those relating to the intervention in the Russian Civil War. 
Like the cemetery in Archangel containing the graves of men who 
died fighting in it, the popular ignorance of the intervention has more 
to do with benign neglect than any official effort to erase it from the 
public imagination. Nevertheless, this attitude is key to understanding 
Wright’s goal of chronicling the service of the military personnel of 
the British Commonwealth who were stationed in Russia between 
1918 and 1921. His book is very much a ground-level account of the 
men in uniform, as Wright focuses on the activities of the soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen engaged in the various campaigns against the 
Soviet regime. Given the considerable geographical scope of the war, 
he divides his coverage of the operations by each of the theatres where 
the men were deployed; though an understandable way of addressing 
the often quite separate efforts of the forces involved, it comes at the 
dual cost of a degree of repetition and the lack of any consideration 
for the interaction between events on the various fronts.
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As Wright explains, Britain effectively stumbled into its intervention 
in Russia’s internecine conflict. The first troops were sent to Russia’s 
ports in 1918 to fight Germans rather than Bolsheviks, with the first 
British forces even landing in Murmansk at the invitation of the local 
soviet. With the collapse of the Imperial German war effort, however, 
the focus quickly shifted to aiding the Whites in their efforts to challenge 
Bolshevik control. Even before the peace treaty had been signed in 
Versailles, companies of men were mustered in Britain specifically for 
service in Russia, with demobilised veterans of the trenches enlisting 
for the pay and bonuses offered. Soon after their arrival, these recruits 
found themselves engaged in small-unit actions against Bolshevik 
forces, often in challenging political and environmental conditions.
One of the merits of Wright’s book is his emphasis on the role that 
Commonwealth forces, such as the Canadian Malamute Company, 
played in the intervention. With their involvement typically noted only 
in passing in most British-centric accounts of the intervention, this 
has the effect of underscoring not just the multinational composition 
of Britain’s effort, but the challenge Britain faced in cobbling together 
a force of sufficient size. This ultimately limited the role that British 
and Commonwealth units could play in the war. While the soldiers 
fought well and scored several victories against Red Army and Navy 
units, theirs was always intended to primarily be a holding action 
while the Whites organised and trained their own forces to defeat the 
Bolsheviks. Yet Wright’s narrative makes clear the doomed nature of 
these hopes. Russian recruits for the White forces were often in poor 
physical condition and ill-prepared for the rigors of military service. 
Even more problematic, though, was the questionable loyalty of the 
men. This was true for both sides, as Wright notes the intelligence 
supplied by turncoats in the Bolshevik ranks on several occasions 
as well as the sometimes egregious inaccuracy of Bolshevik shells 
and bombs. Yet such efforts did not prevent the Red Army from 
maintaining a military effort, while the British soon discovered that 
Whites in Murmansk, Archangel, Siberia, and southern Russia often 
could not muster a coherent force in response. By the end of the war, 
the British and Commonwealth forces were forced to scuttle donated 
vessels and crush planes under the treads of tanks (before driving the 
tanks themselves into the sea) prior to their evacuation in order to 
deny the equipment to advancing Red Army units.
Such an ignominious end provides a tragic tint to the heroism 
Wright details in his book. As a testament to their sacrifices, it 
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is an unqualified success as he describes sympathetically but not 
uncritically their struggles both on and off the battlefield. But even 
with chapters detailing intelligence activities and the experiences 
of British and Commonwealth prisoners-of-war held captive by 
the Bolsheviks, his book still falls short as a study of the military 
intervention overall. While Wright makes effective use of archival 
records, private materials, and the secondary literature relating to his 
subject, his sources are all from the British and Commonwealth side. 
This influences his narrative, as British and Commonwealth officers 
and men are identified by name and even provided with service 
histories while their opposite numbers are simply faceless Bolsheviks. 
While the barrier of language may explain this omission, less excusable 
is his lack of any examination of the British policymaking behind 
the intervention which could have been provided easily enough by 
drawing upon the ample scholarly work that has been done about the 
politics and diplomacy of the conflict over the past century.1 In this 
respect, the title of Wright’s book does a disservice to his subject; 
readers who pick it up expecting an account of Winston Churchill’s 
confrontation with Vladimir Lenin will be disappointed as Churchill 
himself is mentioned little more than a dozen times in the text and 
Lenin even fewer than that. More importantly, the absence of such 
coverage deprives the operations the author describes of any context, 
which artificially constrains his explanation of the outcome. It places 
an unfortunate limitation on Wright’s achievement; while his book 
serves well as an account of British military activities in the Russian 
Civil War, in the end it provides only one piece of the incredibly 
complicated puzzle of Britain’s involvement in it.
mark klobas, scottsdale community college
1  See, for example, W.P. and Z.K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1945); Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik 
Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920-1924 (London: Macmillan, 
1979); Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to War 
and Revolution, 1913-1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); David Carlton, 
Churchill and the Soviet Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); 
Michael Graham Fry, And Fortune Fled: David Lloyd George, the First Democratic 
Statesman, 1916-1922 (New York: Peter Lang, 2011); and the relevant volumes in 
the Documents in British Foreign Policy series. Wright does list Richard Ullman’s 
three-volume Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1961-72) in his bibliography, but his use of it in his text is minimal at best.
3
Klobas: Review of "Churchill’s Secret War with Lenin" by Damien Wright
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,
